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The Advanced Microcontroller Bus Architecture (AMBA) is an open System-on-Chip bus protocol
for high-performance buses on low-power devices. We demonstrate the combined use of model
checking and theorem proving to verify both control and datapath properties in a seamless manner.
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1 Introduction
Typical microprocessor and memory veriﬁcations assume direct connections
between processors, peripherals and memory, and zero latency data transfers.
They abstract away the data transfer infrastructure as it is not relevant to the
veriﬁcation. However, this infrastructure is in itself quite complex and worthy
of formal veriﬁcation.
The Advanced Microcontroller Bus Architecture 2 (AMBA) [2] is an open
System-on-Chip bus protocol for high-performance buses on low-power de-
vices. In this paper we implement a simple model of AMBA and verify latency,
arbitration, coherence and deadlock freedom properties of the implementation.
The veriﬁcation is conducted using holcheck, a model checker for the
propositional µ-calculus Lµ [8], that is part of the hol theorem prover [1].
1 Email:ha227@cl.cam.ac.uk
2 c©1999 ARM Limited. All rights reserved. AMBA is a trademark of ARM Limited.
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Fig. 1. Typical AMBA-based Microcontroller
This allows results from the model checker to be represented as hol theorems
for full compositionality with more abstract theorems proved in HOL using a
formal model theory of Lµ that we have also developed. This tight connection
between model checking and theorem proving is exploited in sections 4 and 5
of this work.
2 AMBA Overview
The AMBA speciﬁcation deﬁnes the following buses:
• Advanced High-performance Bus (AHB): The AHB 3 is a system bus used
for communication between high clock frequency system modules such as
processors and on-chip and oﬀ-chip memories. The AHB consists of bus
masters, slaves, an arbiter, a signal multiplexer and an address decoder.
Typical bus masters are processors and DMA devices.
• Advanced Peripheral Bus (APB): The APB is a peripheral bus specialised
for communication with low-bandwidth low-power devices. It has a simpler
interface and lower power requirements.
The APB has a single bus master module that acts as a bridge between
the AHB and the APB. The AMBA speciﬁcation is hardware and operating
system independent and requires very little infrastructure to implement. Fig-
ure 1 shows a typical AMBA-based microcontroller. We follow revision 2.0 of
the AMBA speciﬁcation [2].
3 The AHB supersedes the AMBA Advanced System Bus (ASB) and is superseded by the
AMBA Advanced eXtensible Interface (AXI).
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3 Speciﬁcation
The AMBA AHB and APB speciﬁcation is a 110 page document. Due to
space constraints, we can only give a brief summary here.
3.1 AMBA APB
The APB is used for connecting the high-bandwith AHB system bus to low-
bandwidth peripherals such as input devices. There is a single bus master, a
single global clock, and all transfers take two cycles. The bus master also acts
as a bridge to the system bus, to which it can be connected as a slave. The
address and data buses can be up to 32 bits wide.
The operation of the APB consists of three stages, all of them are triggered
on the rising edge of the clock:
(i) IDLE. This is the initial and the default state of the bus when no transfer
is underway i.e. all slave select signals are low.
(ii) SETUP. The ﬁrst stage of a transfer is a move to the SETUP state,
signalled by a slave select signal going high. The address and data signals
are asserted during this phase. The direction of transfer (read/write) is
indicated by another signal. This stage always lasts for one clock cycle
and then the operation moves to the ENABLE stage.
(iii) ENABLE. The address, data and control signals are stable during this
phase. This phase also lasts one clock cycle and then moves to the SETUP
or the IDLE stage.
3.2 AMBA AHB
The AHB is a pipelined system backbone bus, designed for high-performance
operation. It can support up to 16 bus masters and slaves that can delay or
retry on transfers. It consists of masters, slaves, an arbiter and an address
decoder. It supports burst and split transfers. The address bus can be up to
32 bits wide, and the data buses can be up to 128 bits wide. As before, there
is a single global clock. We have not described several implementation details
due to space considerations.
The operation of the AHB is too complex to be speciﬁed in terms of a few
ﬁxed stages. A simple transfer might proceed as follows (the list numbering
below is not cycle-accurate):
(i) The AHB is in the default or initial state. No transfer is taking place, all
slaves are ready and no master requires a transfer.
(ii) Several masters request the bus for a transfer.
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(iii) The arbiter grants the bus according to some priority-scheduling algo-
rithm.
(iv) The granted master puts the address and control information on the bus.
(v) The decoder does a combinatorial decode of the address and the selected
slave samples the address.
(vi) The master or the slave put the data on the bus and it is sampled. The
transfer completes.
Items 4-5 above constitutes the address phase of a transfer, and 6 con-
stitutes the data phase. Since the address and data buses are separate, the
address and control information for a transfer are driven during the data phase
of the previous transfer. This is how transfers are pipelined. Several events
can complicate the basic scenario above e.g. extended transfers (slave inserts
wait states), bursts (multiple transfers without renegotiating for bus owner-
ship), splits (master put on hold by slave), retries (master asked to try later)
and aborts (slave signals failure).
Masters
The AHB supports up to 16 bus masters. Each master wishing to initiate
a transfer competes for a bus grant from the arbiter and has its control and
address signals driven to the slave when it gets the bus.
If a master x does not wish to initiate a transfer it drives its bus request
signal to low and if it owns the bus it also signals IDLE. To initiate a transfer,
it drives its bus request signal to high. Upon getting bus ownership (the
arbiter decides this), the address and control signals are driven onto the bus
for exactly one cycle. To initiate the transfer, the master signals NSQ (which
abbreviates “non-sequential”). It also drives the burst signal to low indicating
a single transfer, or to high indicating a multi-beat burst. All this happens
during the one-cycle address phase.
In the next cycle, the master drives the data on to the data buses (or
samples it in case of a read). If this is a burst, then the master also continues
to drive the control signals and to increment the address signals to prepare for
the next beat of the burst. From the second beat onwards, the master signals
SEQ (“sequential”) rather than NSQ.
Masters also need to respond to slave signals for extended transfers (usually
by signalling IDLE), splits (by suspending the current transfer until the slave
is ready), retries (aborting and requesting the bus again) and aborts (aborting
the transfer).
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Multiplexer
The bus uses a central multiplexer interconnect scheme. All masters drive
their address and control signals and the arbiter decides which master’s signals
are routed on to the slaves.
Arbiter
The arbiter uses an arbitration algorithm (e.g. round-robin scheduling;
AMBA does not specify or recommend any particular algorithm) to decide
which master to grant the bus to. Actual bus ownership is not handed over
until the current transfer completes. Additionally, the arbiter is responsible for
keeping track of masters (by internally masking their bus requests) that have
split transfers outstanding and granting the bus to the highest priority one
when the corresponding slave signals that is it ready to continue the transfer.
Decoder
The decoder simply performs a direct decode of the address bus. The
appropriate higher order bits indicate the selected slave and the rest are used
by slaves to determine source/target registers.
Slaves
Once a transfer begins it is up to the slave to determine how it proceeds.
The slave can do one of the following:
• If all is well, the slave responds by signalling READY and OK, and the
transfer is straightforward.
• If the slave needs a little time during the data phase, it can extend the phase
by inserting wait states by driving READY to low and signalling OK. Note
that the address phase cannot be extended.
• If the slave cannot complete the transfer immediately it can issue a SPLIT
response, if it is SPLIT-capable.
• If a non-SPLIT-capable slave cannot complete a transfer immediately it
signals RETRY. Retried transfers must be restarted from scratch.
• In case of a complete failure, the slave signals to ERROR, and ignores the
rest of the transfer.
The RETRY, SPLIT and ERROR responses take two cycles (READY is
low in the ﬁrst cycle, high in the second), to give the master time to re-drive
the address and control signals onto the bus.
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4 Implementation
We implement the APB by following the speciﬁcation in a straightforward
manner without any optimizations.
4.1 Assumptions
We make some simplifying assumptions:
(i) All signals are valid throughout, i.e. there is no glitching. Sub-cycle
timing (i.e. timing delays between signals becoming stable after changing)
is ignored.
(ii) Since there is a single global clock triggering all signals, transitions of the
state machine are synchronous. For the same reason, it suﬃces to model
the clock implicitly by equating one transition of the system to one clock
cycle.
(iii) Endian-ness is not ﬁxed, but is assumed to be consistent throughout.
These assumptions preserve the properties of the model that we are inter-
ested in. This is because all properties are at the signal level, and because the
speciﬁcation itself uses a single clock and does not specify endian-ness.
For AHB, we restrict the model further:
(i) We model 8 masters. The speciﬁcation places an upper bound of 16 on
the number of masters.
(ii) We model 16 slaves. The speciﬁcation places no upper bound on the
number of slaves.
(iii) Slaves may split on at most one master. The speciﬁcation recommends
(but does not require) that all split-capable slaves be able to split on the
maximum number of masters.
The bound in the second assumption is arbitrary and increasing it appears
not to signiﬁcantly tax our model checker. The third assumption is due to
constrained development time. The ﬁrst assumption is the only one forced
upon us: increasing the number of masters causes an exponential increase in
the size of the state space and our system cannot cope. This is likely because
holcheck currently lacks standard model checking optimizations such as
partitioning and symmetry reductions. We note however that earlier AMBA
veriﬁcations used considerably more constrained models [11,12].
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4.2 The Formal Model
We convert the speciﬁcation to a formal model in hol, expressed as a set
of deﬁnitions. The internal behaviour of the master and slaves has been ab-
stracted away, as being irrelevant to the veriﬁcation. Since this is a hardware
model, and since it will eventually be model checked, it is convenient to model
the system as a state machine.
We deﬁne our state machines for APB and AHB, MAPB and MAHB re-
spectively. Signals are modelled as a boolean variables, and a state s¯APB/AHB
is represented as a tuple of these variables. We deﬁne an initial states pred-
icate S0APB/AHB on states, and a transition predicate RAPB/AHB on states
and “next” states. As the model is synchronous, S0APB/AHB and RAPB/AHB
are just the conjunctions of the respective predicates for the system modules,
such as masters, slaves and the arbiter. Our system internally converts these
predicates to a formal Kripke model, preparatory to model checking.
The full formal model is about 1600 lines of hol deﬁnitions. Due to space
constraints, we illustrate the formal modelling using the deﬁnitions for the
AHB arbiter (we implement a simple priority-based one), and present notable
features from other deﬁnitions. The full model will be made available with
the upcoming Kananaskis-3 release of hol.
Deﬁnition 4.1 S0
arb
AHB(s¯AHB)n = GRANT n ∧MASTERn
The initial states predicate for the arbiter is paramterized by the total
number of masters less one. It says that we start with the highest priority
master being granted (GRANT n) and having bus ownership (MASTER n).
There are 8 masters, numbered from 0 to 7 (in increasing order of priority).
Thus we instantiate this predicate with n = 7. We take some liberty with
the formal notation here: GRANT n in hol is actually GRANT n (grant0, ...)
where the tuple contains all the boolean variables granti corresponding to
arbiter grant signals, and similarly for the other signals.
The transition relation is more complex:





(if n = 0 then GRANT ′ 0
else if MASK n ∧BUSREQn ∧ IDLE then GRANT ′ n
else RarbAHB(s¯AHB, s¯
′
AHB) (n− 1)) ∧ (1)
(MASTER′ n = if READY then GRANT n else MASTERn) ∧ (2)
(if SPLIT ∧ ¬READY ∧MASTERn then MASK ′ n
else if HSPLIT n then ¬MASK ′ n
else MASK ′ n = MASK n)) (3)
This predicate is also parameterized by the total number of masters less
one. We prime a predicate to denote that its elided second argument (the
boolean tuple) consists of primed next-state variables. Conjunct (1) says that
the highest priority master that requests the bus is to be granted the bus,
provided the bus is idle and the master is not masked. Conjunct (2) says the
currently granted master is to be given bus ownership when the last active
slave has signalled READY (indicating completion of transfer). Conjunct (3)
says that a split master should be masked, or else unmasked if the slave that
signalled the split signals the end of the split via HSPLIT.
The use of the theorem prover’s higher-order logic as our modelling lan-
guage allows us to deﬁne components in a natural manner, using recursion,
parameterization and higher order predicates. A straightforward invocation of
the hol simpliﬁer unfolds an instantiated version of this deﬁnition into com-
pletely boolean model-checkable form, by expanding out the recursion and
rewriting out the deﬁnitions of the predicates.
Another instance of this automation is the following conjunct from the
deﬁnition of a split-capable slave
∀m.m < 8⇒ ¬HSLV SPLT nm⇒ ¬HSPLIT ′ m
which prohibits a slave n from asserting the “unsplit now” HSPLIT signal for a
master m, if n was not the slave that split on m originally (HSLV SPLT nm).
This line showcases the use of bounded quantiﬁcation as well as of predicates
with multiple parameters.
In the deﬁnition of the arbiter, we used MASK signals, which are not
explicitly mentioned in the speciﬁcation as part of the arbiter control interface.
However, their use is required for a correct implementation. Since we are using
hol, abstracting the MASK signals out of the arbiter interface is simply a
matter of existentially quantifying the arbiter deﬁnition with respect to these
signals. So we have a straightforward method for hiding details that are
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necessary for a correct model, but are of no concern to clients of the module.
Being able to use hidden variables, recursion, parameterization, abbrevia-
tions and bounded quantiﬁcation as modelling constructs is not a novelty of
our system. However, we do get readability, automation and a proof of cor-
rectness of the automatic translation between the human-readable (and hence
human prover usable) and the model-checkable forms of the model, simply by
virtue of integration with hol, with no extra development eﬀort. This is one
of the many ways in which using a tight integration of model checking with a
theorem prover pays oﬀ.
5 Veriﬁcation
CTL [3] is a temporal logic commonly used in symbolic model checking. We
model check various standard bus architecture CTLproperties for our imple-
mentation, by translating them to Lµ via hol. As usual, a property is con-
sidered veriﬁed if the set of satisfying states include the initial states.
5.1 Datapath compression
Model checkers typically run into trouble when the datapath is introduced,
due to the sheer number of new state variables. However, we observe that in
the APB (and indeed the AHB) implementation, data and address signals are
only copied around and their actual values do not inﬂuence system behaviour
(with the exception of some of the higher bits of the address used by the
decoder, but these can be split away or the decoding abstracted), i.e., they
are data independent. This suggests a simple abstraction that signiﬁcantly
reduces the number of state variables.
Our data and address signals only ever occur in equality tests (or can
be formally rewritten to be so). If there are n such tests, then allowing each
signal to range over a ﬁnite type with n values is suﬃcient to allow all possible
combinations of successes and failures of the equality tests. If a signal can only
have n values, it can be modelled in the standard way by ceil(log2n) boolean
variables.
For example, our APB implementation has six address and data signals, 12
including the next-state versions. Thus any possible combination of equality
tests over these signals requires them range over at most 12 values. Hence
each signal can be modelled with four boolean variables, rather than 32 or 64.
We are in the process of formalising this reasoning in hol. This belongs
to a well-known class of model checking abstractions known as symbolic ab-
stractions [6]. Our novelty lies in the formalization and automation aspects.
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5.2 Verifying APB
5.2.1 Latency and Coherence
Latency properties check that the bus becomes available within a given number
of cycles. We can use them to check that wait and/or transfer times do
not exceed design speciﬁcations. Coherence properties check data coherency,
i.e. registers are updated correctly at the end of transfers. Since transfers are
multi-cycle, target registers are not updated immediately. Thus by checking
that the update happens in precisely two cycles, we can also check the transfer






((¬PENABLE ∧ PSELx ∧ PWRITE)
⇒ ((AXAXSDATAx) = MDATA))
∧ ((¬PENABLE ∧ PSELx ∧ ¬PWRITE)
⇒ (SDATAx = (AXAXMDATA)))
Here PSELx denotes that slave x is selected, PENABLE high indicates
that we have reached the third stage of the APB transfer, PWRITE indicates
whether the transfer is read or write, and SDATAx and MDATA represent
the source/target registers for the slave and master respectively.
Note that the theorem statement as written is ill-typed with respect to
CTL semantics. In particular, AXAXSDATAx is ill-typed, since SDATAx
is not a proposition. This is notational abuse, abbreviating the fact that the
property was actually checked for each bit representing the datapath variables.
Thanks to datapath compression, the model checker was able to cope.
Henceforth we shall simply state the property that was veriﬁed, as all
formal theorem statements follow the same pattern.
5.2.2 Deadlock Freedom
In concurrency theory, the term deadlock refers to an abnormal termination
or freeze of the system. In terms of automata such as Kripke structures, this
may be represented by a state with no outgoing transitions.
We can check that this undesirable situation does not occur. Our APB
transition relation has been deﬁned by assigning all next-state variables some
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value in each cycle, so the simple CTLproperty
AGEXTrue
(to check that there is no terminal state) is in a sense vacuously true and does
not tell us anything.
On account of this, we need to have some criterion for system deadlock.
We know that once a transfer is underway, it always completes, by Theorem
5.1. So it remains only to check that a transfer can always be initiated. This
can be checked by the following property schema:
AG(AF(PSELx⊕¯PENABLE ⇒ EXPSELy))
where ⊕¯ is negated exclusive-OR. This property checks that PSEL (for any
slave) can go high if the APB is idle or has just ﬁnished a transfer. The model
checker returns the required theorems.
5.3 Verifying AHB
We verify arbitration, latency, coherence and deadlock freedom properties for
AHB. The BDD variable ordering used was an interleaving of the current and
next-state variables, which was then reordered after a manual dependency
analysis.
5.3.1 Arbitration
The ﬁrst properties we verify relate to arbitration. Typically such properties
conﬁrm that the arbiter is fair in some sense.
Our implementation is a simple priority based one and is obviously not
meant to be fair in the sense that all requests are ultimately granted. This
should hold true for the highest priority master m however. This can be
checked using the CTLproperty
AG(BUSREQm⇒ AXGRANT m ∨AFHSPLIT m⇒ AXGRANT m)
This states that the highest priority master is either granted immediately (if
it was not masked) or is masked (which means it is waiting on a split transfer)
and is granted when the split transfer it is waiting on is continued via an
HSPLIT signal.
For other masters, the best we can hope for is that the possibility of a
grant exists. This is the same property as before, except that m is replaced
by the number of the master, and AX is replaced by EX throughout.
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5.3.2 Latency
Latency checking for the AHB is more complicated than for the APB, as the
presence of bursts, busy signals and wait states means that the transfer times
are variable.
Since we have limits on the length of bursts, the number of consecutive
busy signals and the number of consecutive wait states, we should be able
to conﬁrm that a transfer will take at most a given number of cycles. This
number is in fact 34 cycles (1 address phase cycle + 16 burst cycles + 16
wait states + 1 BUSY signal) in the case of our implementation so far. The
CTLproperty saying this is more neatly expressed if we ﬁrst deﬁne a function
LAT :
LAT f 0 = f
LAT f (n + 1) = f ∨AX(LATfn)
This expresses in CTL a latency of at most n cycles until the event described by
f holds. The required property is then given by the following CTLproperty:
AG ((NSQ ∧ SINGLE ⇒ LAT (READY ∧ OK) 2) ∧
(NSQ ∧ INC ⇒ LAT ((READY ∧ OK)
∨RETRY ∨ERROR ∨ SPLIT ) 34 ∧
AXA[¬NSQU (READY ∧OK)
∨RETRY ∨ ERROR ∨ SPLIT ]))
noting that a single transfer (signalled by SINGLE) takes only two cycles and
that a burst (signalled by INC), if not interrupted, must ﬁnish within 34 cycles.
An unfolding of LAT would reveal several relational product computations,
which are time and space consuming. We can make our task easier by using
the following lemma derived from the CTL semantics.
Lemma 5.2
 ∀fgMs.s M AG(f ∧ g) ⇐⇒ s M AGf ∧ s M AGg
Proof Simple rewriting with our formal semantics of Lµ and CTL [1]. 
We can thus split 4 the latency property above into the two conjuncts
AG (NSQ ∧ SINGLE ⇒ LAT (READY ∧ OK) 2) (4)
and
4 Technically of course, we are not splitting the formula but the statement of its satisﬁa-
bility. We elide these details to avoid clutter.
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AG (NSQ ∧ INC ⇒ LAT ((READY ∧ OK) (5)
∨RETRY ∨ ERROR ∨ SPLIT ) 10 ∧
AXA[¬NSQU (READY ∧OK)
∨RETRY ∨ ERROR ∨ SPLIT ])
Using standard propositional logic lifted to CTL (trivial using hol) to-
gether with our formal CTL semantics, we can further split conjunct 5 above
into
AG (NSQ ∧ INC ⇒ LAT ((READY ∧ OK) (6)
∨RETRY ∨ERROR ∨ SPLIT ) 10)
and
AG (NSQ ∧ INC ⇒ AXA[¬NSQU (READY ∧OK) (7)
∨RETRY ∨ ERROR ∨ SPLIT ])
Now the satisﬁability theorem for conjunct 7 follows from a simpliﬁed version
of the latency property which is model checked easily. The satisﬁability theo-
rems for conjuncts 4 and 6 are derived by model checking. All three resulting
theorems can then be recombined in hol using lemma 5.2 to give the required
theorem.
5.3.3 Coherence
Coherence properties are veriﬁed practically identically to the manner in which
they are done for APB. As before the datapath compression makes this feasi-
ble.
5.4 Verifying AMBA
So far, we have separately checked correctness properties for the AHB and
APB components of AMBA. Ideally, since the signals of the AHB and the
APB do not overlap, these properties hold in the combined system, in which
the APB is connected via a bridge to the AHB. However, conjoining RAHB and
RAPB will result in a large system which may be infeasible or time consuming
to model check directly. We can instead construct a compositional proof in
the theorem prover.
The ﬁrst task is to deﬁne the bridge. This is the APB master that acts
as a slave to the AHB. We ﬁrst deﬁne the states over which the bridge would
operate.
Deﬁnition 5.3 s¯bridge = s¯AHB × s¯APB
and as before we write s¯′bridge do denote the “next” state. The bridge
transition relation Rbridge follows from this.













Now we can deﬁne a new transition relation for the APB with Rbridge as














We use existential abstraction to hide behaviours we wish to ignore. This
allows us to show that the new transition relation preserves all behaviours.
Lemma 5.6  RAPB(s¯APB, s¯
′
APB) = RAPB2(s¯APB, s¯
′
APB)
Proof In the ⇒ direction we need to furnish the appropriate witnesses for
the existentially quantiﬁed variables. This is done by using the integrated
SAT solver in hol to ﬁnd a satisfying assignment for RslavexAHB (s¯AHB, s¯
′
AHB).
The rest follows by simpliﬁcation. The ⇐ direction is straightforward. .
Using Lemma 5.6, it is trivial to show that the properties proved in the
model MAPB with transition relation RAPB also hold in the model MAPB2
with transition relation RAPB2.
Theorem 5.7  ∀f.s¯APB MAPB f ⇒ s¯APB MAPB2 f
We can similarly deﬁne RAHB2 in which we can replace one of the generic
slaves with Rbridge, this time hiding the APB signals, and conclude that all
properties proved for the AHB hold when one of the slaves is the APB master.
At a more general level, we can show, without any extra model checking,
that properties proved for for AHB and APB hold in the combined system.
First we need a technical lemma.
Lemma 5.8 If any M1 and M2 are the same except that M1.AP ⊆ M2.AP ,
then
∀fs1s2.s1 M1 f ⇐⇒ s2 M2 f
Here, M1.AP represents the set of atomic propositions occuring in the
deﬁnition of M1. This just states that adding extra unused propositions to a
model does not change its behaviour. Note that the underlying state type of
the two models is diﬀerent and thus trivial amendments have to be made to
M2 to satisfy the type checker. The main result then states that properties
proved for a sub-system can be shown to be true of the entire system, provided
certain conditions hold.
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Theorem 5.9 For any universal property f and models M1 and M2,
∀s.s M1 f ⇒ s M2 f
provided M2 is the synchronous parallel composition of M1 with some M such
that every transition of M2 has a corresponding transition in M1 .
Note that Theorem 5.9 requires both models to have the same state type.
This is where Lemma 5.8 is used (to add the extra propostions of the system
M2 to the sub-system M1).
We can now deﬁne the full AMBA model MAMBA by deﬁning
RAMBA = RAHB2 ∧RAPB2
and deﬁning the rest of the MAMBA tuple in the usual manner. Then, for
example, we can take MAPB as M1 and MAMBA as M2, and use Theorem
5.7 and Theorem 5.9 to show that all universal APB properties hold in the
AMBA system. And similarly for the AHB. We have thus proved, without
using the model checker, that all universal properties proved for AHB and
APB separately also hold in the combined system. This result does not apply
to the non-universal deadlock freedom properties; deadlock freedom in a sub-
system does not imply deadlock freedom overall.
Though we used interactive theorem proving, the general technique can
be applied in any similar situation and it is possible to envision writing proof
script generation functions in ML that would automate much of the task.
6 Related Work
Two recent veriﬁcations targeting AMBA AHB were presented in 2003. The
ﬁrst work [12] uses the acl2 theorem prover to prove arbitration and coherence
properties for arbitrary numbers of slaves and masters. Time is abstracted
away and intra-transfer complications (such as bursts, wait states, splits and
retries) are ignored. This is because theorem provers used alone are better
suited for attacking datapath properties at a high level of abstraction, without
the clutter of cycle-level control signals.
The second work uses the smv model checker to ﬁx bugs in an academic
implementation (they ignore the datapath and several control signals and
use the minimal number of masters and slaves) of AMBA AHB [11]. They
concentrate on a no-starvation violation (a master is denied access to the bus
forever) which however is caused by an error in the implementation of their
arbiter rather than in the protocol itself.
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More recently, work is in progress on porting a Z speciﬁcation of AMBA
AHB [10] to hol. This work is still in the draft stage.
A recent Ph.D. thesis [13] veriﬁes roughly the same set of AHB properties
as ours for a more complex implementation using the cadence smv model
checker and the acl2 theorem prover and imports the results in hol as trusted
theorems. The emphasis here is on using specialist tools as oracles for hol
and the veriﬁcation process itself is not discussed at length.
The almost total lack of interaction between control and data in bus designs
makes it relatively easy to do the kind of abstractions that model checkers
are good at. Bus architectures and the somewhat related domain of cache
coherence protocols have thus long been staples of model checking case studies
[4,5,7,9].
7 Conclusion
The AMBA speciﬁcation is a 110 page document, laying out the design in the
usual mix of english and timing diagrams. We have developed a formal hol
model of the AHB and APB components at the cycle-level and model-checked
standard properties. We have then used hol to compose the two veriﬁcations.
It remains to be investigated whether we can extend this approach to verify
properties over arbitrary numbers of masters and slaves.
The complete high-level model had 172 control bits, and, eﬀectively, an
arbitrary number of datapath bits which were reduced to 206 bits via datapath
compression. The model checking runs were not particularly time or space
intensive and all went through in a few minutes at most on a 3.0GHz Pentium
IV, using no more than about 350MB of RAM. We attribute this to our
restricted AHB model, the decompositions, and datapath compression.
The work illustrates how we can seamlessly combine theorem proving,
model checking and SAT solvers for abstract modelling, and to perform de-
composition (e.g. the AHB latency theorem and Theorem 5.9) and abstraction
(e.g. datapath compression and Theorem 5.7) for model checking. It is diﬀer-
ent from earlier work in that both control and data properties are veriﬁed for
APB+AHB using a single integrated system, achieving a pragmatic balance
between eﬃciency and soundness.
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